Tag: Migration

Building Sustainable, Inclusive and Just Cities (Hons module)

The Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Domestic Worker Communities in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China

Post author By whc8
Post date Tuesday 6 January 2026
No Comments on The Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Domestic Worker Communities in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China

Statement of Positionality

I am not a member of the community discussed in this report, although I grew up surrounded by, and having close friendships with, Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong Kong. I feel able to speak to the MDW community because my experiences growing up in Hong Kong have afforded me an understanding of the city, it’s urban communities, societal structures, systemic hierarchies, and general workings as a diverse metropolis that oftentimes maintains its pride in being a modern, international, and humane city by turning a blind eye to the mistreatment of certain groups that form an essential part of its urban fabric.

Introduction

At the end of 2022, there were approximately 338,000 migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong (Immigration Department, 2023). This community, composed overwhelmingly of women from Indonesia and The Philippines, occupy a unique migrant status – they reside in Hong Kong on temporary, contract-based employment visas that come with stringent restrictions, including the denial of the right to ever qualify for citizenship (Tong and Jiang, 2020), and are protected by a minimum wage that is significantly lower then the limit protecting locals (Cheung et. al, 2019). They are Hong Kong’s largest ethnic minority, and as of 2016 represented 9.3% of the overall workforce (Churchill, 2022). Since the 1970s when this type of migration from the Philippines and Indonesia began to grow, migrant domestic workers, henceforth referred to as MDWs, have formed an integral part of the fabric of Hong Kong’s society. In 2018, they contributed an estimated USD$12.6 billion to the economy, which was 3.6% of the GDP that year (Experian Asia Pacific and Enrich HK, 2019). Additionally, they allow a significant number of mothers the freedom to seek employment outside of the home, with local NGO Enrich HK estimating that over 110,000 local mothers were able to return to work in 2018 due to their employment of a MDW (Experian Asia Pacific and Enrich HK, 2019). This community’s economic and social contributions are immense. Despite this, they are disproportionately subject to violence, exploitation, and abuse. It is estimated that up to 95% of MDWs in the region have experienced some form of exploitation, while a shocking one in six has been the victim of forced labour (Churchill, 2022). This report sets out to examine the conditions that result in such high levels of abuse and exploitation, the unique challenges MDWs face, and the steps that may be taken by this community to improve the nature of their temporary, but often lengthy and incredibly difficult period of residency in Hong Kong.

Challenges

In order to understand the abuse and exploitation faced by this community, a closer look at the policy initiatives and legislation surrounding the unique visa status of MDWs is necessary. The process of securing a visa and coming to Hong Kong is typically facilitated by an agency.

Although there is some legislation to protect MDWs from agency exploitation, it is largely ineffective. Agencies regularly charge exorbitant fees, putting MDWs into debt before they even step foot on Hong Kong soil, and engage in additional exploitative practices like the confiscation of essential documents, such as passports and marriage certificates. The legal limit that employment agencies may charge under Hong Kong law is HKD $430, yet when surveyed the majority of MDWs report being charged at least HKD $5,000 (Churchill, 2022). Furthermore, an Amnesty International Report found that the majority of Indonesian MDWs experienced the confiscation of at least one essential document by a recruitment agency, explicitly for the purpose of ensuring full fee payment if the MDW were to pull out during any stage of the recruitment process, a sum often amounting to over 17 months of wages (Churchill, 2022).

Obtaining a visa and ensuring employment is extremely difficult without the help of an agency, and consequently many MDWs begin their time in Hong Kong heavily in debt and therefore primed to remain in exploitative or abusive employment situations.

Once employed in Hong Kong, MDWs are subject to specific restrictions on their work contracts and living arrangements that make them particularly vulnerable to abuse, isolation, and discrimination. One such restriction is the “Live-in Rule”(Churchill, 2022). MDWs are required to engage in employment with a Standard Employment Contract, which by law contains a mandatory clause stipulating that they must reside within their employer’s home. To reside independently of their employers is a crime, and MDWs who do so risk criminal prosecution and deportation (Churchill, 2022). The Live-in Rule exists primarily due to Hong Kong’s housing and overcrowding crisis. Rent and housing prices are notoriously high in Hong Kong, and it is widely believed that the Live-in Rule protects locals from being penalised by the presence of MDWs in the city. However, residing within their employer’s homes make MDWs extremely vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and makes them more likely to be denied their legal rights, because they have no place of refuge from a demanding or abusive employer (Churchill, 2022). Standard Employment Contracts also don’t specify a maximum number of working hours (Bell, 2005) and this, in conjunction with the Live-in rule, means that MDWs frequently work upwards of 17 hours a day, with little to no distinction between working hours and downtime.

Another restriction that contributes to the vulnerability of MDWs is the “Two Week Rule.” The “Two Week Rule” is a piece of immigration law that The United Nation Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has cited as being a key contributor to the high levels of exploitation and abuse experienced by MDWs (Cheung et. al, 2019). The rule states that MDWs have two weeks to find new employment if their contract is terminated by either them or their employers. Many MDWs find it difficult to find new employment in such a short span of time, and so frequently opt to remain working in abusive, exploitative households rather then attempting to change employers and risk losing wages that are essential to family back home, or to the paying off of debts incurred through the use of recruitment agencies.

In addition to the legislative factors that contribute to this community’s challenges, local attitudes to MDWs and discrimination play an important role in the difficulties this group faces. MDWs, due to their unique temporary immigration status, levels of poverty, status as women, and distinct ethnic identity, are frequently regarded by locals as second class citizens. They are regularly subjected to discrimination, and this is a contributing factor to the proliferation of mistreatment they face both in the households they service and in public life. Discrimination against MDWs is so widespread and embedded into the cultural fabric of Hong Kong that it has been suggested that MDWs face “elite racism”, a type of racism stemming from bodies with official societal influence, such as media organisations, schools, universities, or politicians (Ladegaard, 2013). This can be clearly seen in newspaper reports on incidents of abuse against MDWs. Major, respected, and widely read Hong Kong based newspapers such as the South China Morning Post will often report on cases of abuse by emphasising the positive qualities of the employer accused, or even convicted, of abuse, such as their devotion to their family, and will often highlight the life stressors the employer was suffering around the timeframe of the abuse (Ladegaard, 2013). Contrarily, the negative traits of the MDW in such cases are often emphasised. For example if their education status is relatively low, they may be characterised as a ‘high-school dropout’, or portrayed as money hungry and ungrateful (Ladegaard, 2013).

Furthermore, it is a commonly espoused belief among Hong Kong locals that Hong Kong is a MDWs ‘paradise’. It is widely believed that they are treated better in Hong Kong than they are in many other countries with large MDW populations, such as Singapore and the Gulf States. There is also a common sentiment that they are lucky to have the opportunity to come work in Hong Kong as a means of escape from the extreme poverty of their home countries, and should be grateful and submissive as a result (Ladegaard, 2013). This characterisation of MDWs as incredibly lucky to be working in Hong Kong legitimises exploitation, and is used to justify both the relatively scant rights that they are afforded, and the insufficient protection of those rights that they do have.

Approaches/ Recommendations

Of the many issues that MDWs in Hong Kong are faced with, the focus of this report is the issues of abuse and exploitation because they are rampant, and among the greatest challenges that the MDW community has to contend with. Although there is much that needs to be done at a governance and policy level to combat these problems, there are also measures that the community can take to address these challenges. The measures this report recommends centre primarily around community building, strengthening understanding of legal protections, developing greater financial literacy, and turning to strategic channels of organisation and protest.

Research conducted on the MDW community in Hong Kong has found that gathering and participating in activities that affirm community bonds and cultural, as well as personal, identity is a hugely powerful means of protecting MDW wellbeing. On this point, it is important to note two things. The first is that the vast majority of MDWs do not have much free time with which to gather and socialise – they are legally entitled to one rest day, Sunday, a week, and very few receive more time off than this. Furthermore, one of the most common forms of exploitation MDWs experience is the denial of this rest day, and in such cases gathering and participating in community events becomes at best a rarity, if not an impossibility. The second important thing to note is that the importance of gathering is something the MDW community already understands. MDWs in Hong Kong have the right to gather, form organisations, and host demonstrations of both a political and a recreational nature, a right this community can frequently be seen making excellent use of (Lai, 2010). This becomes visible every Sunday, when the government blocks off several main roads in Central, the city’s financial district, for the recreational use of MDWs. Due to the primarily outdoor, public nature of these gatherings, once a week MDWs become an unmissable part of Hong Kong’s urban landscape. That being said, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of building strong social connections and community ties in Hong Kong for this community’s well being, and this report would be incomplete without an exploration of this. The amount of social capital a MDW possesses, as measured in the form of friendship networks and attendance of a regular religious service, is associated with decreased likelihood of experiencing underpay, and a higher likelihood of reporting decent working conditions, as measured by access to a private and adequately sized room within their employers house, and fewer hours worked on average per day (Tong and Jiang, 2020). There is certainly a chicken and egg dimension to this – MDWs who are overworked or denied time off are less able to take the time required to socialise and form connections. Nonetheless, friendships and community support certainly play an important role in the protection of MDW rights, and in their ability to find employment with ‘decent’ employers, something MDWs often emphasise as being a priority for them out of a concern for avoiding exploitation (Bell, 2005). One possible reason for this is that MDWs who have been in Hong Kong for longer are more likely to know what their legal protections are and, crucially, what to do if their rights are violated. MDWs are rarely informed of their rights before arriving in Hong Kong, and are often encouraged by recruitment agencies to be compliant and obedient, rather than informed and vocal (Yeung et al, 2020). As a result, new MDWs often arrive in Hong Kong with a very limited understanding of the legal protections available to them. Even in instances where they are aware of a violation of their rights, one common reason for not reporting these violations is a lack of knowledge of how or where to file a complaint (Tong and Jiang, 2020). MDWs who have been in Hong Kong for longer, however, are more likely to have knowledge about their legal protections, and the proper channels to use to access these protections (Tong and Jiang, 2020). Friendship networks and social capital offers newer migrants a way to access knowledge accumulated by MDWs who have been in Hong Kong for longer, and regularly socialising offers MDWs the opportunity to know when they are being subjected to unacceptable conditions, and can give them the ability to ask for help from friends who may be better equipped to know what the best course of action is. Thus, regularly participating in community gathering and strengthening social networks is a powerful tool for MDWs to be best equipped to protect their rights and safeguard their wellbeing.

There is an additional element to community gathering which may help MDWs feel better able to assert their rights, which is the assertion of cultural and individual identity beyond their migrant worker status. Community gatherings can take many different forms, and MDWs have been known to mobilise to hold carnivals and performances in the city’s public parks and on the streets, where performances showcasing visual art forms such as dance, often along lines traditional to Indonesian and Filipino culture, are held (Lai, 2010). It has been argued that the everyday existence of most MDWs, characterised by isolated work within a local household, denies the heritages, individual interests, and subjectivities that are essential for a strong sense of self and community (Lai, 2010). This has an impact both on the discriminatory practices of employers, and on how MDWs view themselves. Surveys on mental health among MDW women have found that they are disproportionately vulnerable to self-stigma, a form of internalised stigma that individuals may harbour due to living in a society that discriminates against them for an element of their identity, or their minority status (Yeung et al, 2020). This has an obvious negative impact on sense of wellbeing, confidence, resilience, and self esteem, among other factors necessary for MDWs to feel capable of asserting their rights, reporting abuse, and where possible removing themselves from exploitative situations. Staging and participating in community oriented artistic endeavours strengthens the identity and visibility of MDW communities, and asserts to both local Hong Kongers and MDWs alike that these communities are composed of multifaceted human beings deserving of humane treatment. This may seem like an obvious, or even redundant, assertion, but in the context of a society that has shown itself time and time again to regard MDWs as disposable bodies for labour and service, it is not.

Another tool available to the MDW community to combat exploitation and abuse is developing financial literacy. Approximately 83% of MDWs are in debt (Enrich HK). This is due to several reasons, one large one being the previously discussed illegal overcharging of recruitment agencies, and another significant reason being the obligation to send money back home. MDWs frequently support dependents in their home country. For many, the ability to support dependents is their primary motivation for migrating to Hong Kong. It can be an expectation from relatives for the MDW to send the majority of their salary home, and it can be extremely difficult to resist the pressure of this expectation even when it isn’t realistic, particularly when children, elderly family members, and loved ones are dependent on their income for things like food, housing, and school fees (Zhou, Dai, and Jung, 2019). As a result, MDWs, who are likely already in debt from the migration process, often take out further loans, and as formal banking credit services are not available to them, they borrow from money lenders who make loans with steep interest rates readily available to MDWs (Zhou, Dai, and Jung, 2019). This is a major issue, as having debt and/or insufficient savings drastically increases the likelihood of remaining in an exploitative employment situation. It is also a common reason for remaining in Hong Kong past the intended duration of their stay, something most MDWs are keen to avoid, as most come to Hong Kong with the intention of working for a limited period of time, saving enough money to achieve certain goals such as putting their children through school, and then returning home. It is important to not regard financial literacy as something that can be taken for granted, particularly in an environment where there are many challenges in place that threaten financial security. Rather, financial literacy should be regarded as a tool that can, and should, be actively learned. One excellent avenue for accessing education on financial literacy is local NGO Enrich HK. Enrich offers workshops to MDWs taught in Bahasa and English, that teach strategies for saving, paying off debt, entrepreneurship skills, and offers a mentorship program to tackle individualised financial problems from a specified and personal angle (Zhou, Dai, and Jung, 2019). The long term benefits of participating in these programs for helping MDWs get and stay out of debt, and achieve goals such a starting a business back home or financing their children’s education, have been studied and found to be significant (Zhou, Dai, and Jung, 2019).

The final suggestion this report puts forward for the MDW community to target the unacceptably high levels of exploitation and abuse that they are subject to is to engage in strategic channels of organisation and protest. Despite this community’s lack of access to many of the protections afforded to citizens and locals, MDWs have historically possessed the right to gather, stage demonstrations, and form organisations to support their interests in Hong Kong (Lai, 2010). While the recent implementation of the National Security Law has made many forms of protest dangerous, or illegal, the right to association for MDWs remains protected under the Hong Kong Employment Ordinance. As discussed above, demonstrations that centre cultural and artistic forms of expression can help combat discrimination (Lai, 2010). Protest that targets specific desired changes in policy can also be beneficial, and is potentially more effective than general protest. For example, demonstrations and organisations formed to combat the ‘two-week rule’ or ‘the live-in rule’ specifically, may be a more effective way of bringing about a concrete reduction in exploitation and abuse than more general demonstrations against discrimination or exploitation as a whole. Additionally, there are many unions and NGOs, such as the Indonesian Migrant Workers Union, the Hong Kong Federation of Asian Domestic Workers Unions, and Enrich HK, that work to further the cause of MDW wellbeing. MDWs who engage with these organisations display a better understanding of the rights and protections they are entitled to, and are more likely to be involved in activism that has the potential to bring about meaningful change (Lai, 2010). Additionally, the Labour Department meets periodically with Domestic Worker Unions and NGOs, for example during their annual meeting with groups that represent MDW interests to review the minimum wage (ALR Editors, 2022). While this by no means guarantees that the concerns of MDW groups will be sincerely used to inform policy, participation in these organisations should not be overlooked as a way for MDWs to have their voices and concerns heard directly by the government, and this report strongly encourages that MDWs engage with, and participate in, labour unions and NGOs designed to improve living and working conditions for this community.

Conclusion

Several suggestions have been put forth in this report that may help the MDW community protect itself against exploitation and abuse. It is important to emphasise that MDW action alone is not the sole solution to these problems. Serious changes need to happen at the governmental and policy levels to protect the members of this community that is both uniquely vulnerable, and undervalued for its immense contributions to Hong Kong’s society. However, the suggestions put forth in this report hopefully offer MDWs a framework for understanding the tools available to them, and the actions they can take to safeguard their wellbeing, protect their rights, fight for necessary change, and ultimately avoid abuse and exploitation as they work to support themselves and their families in a city that owes them humane treatment, protection, and respect.

Bibliography

Bell, D. (2005a). Justice for Migrant Domestic Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore . In: Global Justice and the Bulwarks of Localism. [online] Brill, pp.291–316. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047416005_016.

Cheung, J.T.K., Tsoi, V.W.Y., Wong, K.H.K. and Chung, R.Y. (2019). Abuse and Depression among Filipino Foreign Domestic helpers. A cross-sectional Survey in Hong Kong.

Public Health, 166, pp.121–127. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2018.09.020.

Churchill, Daniel (2020-2022). ‘Crimmigation’ and the Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong. City University of Hong Kong Law Review, 8, pp.15-48. Available at: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ciunhok8&id=23&collection=journals&index=

Editors, A.L.R. (2022). Unions Ramping Up Pressure for Respecting Rights of Hong Kong’s Foreign Domestic Workers. [online] Asian Labour Review. Available at: https://labourreview.org/unions-ramping-up-pressure-for-respecting-rights-of-hong- kongs-foreign-domestic-workers/ [Accessed 5 Jan. 2023].

Enrich HK (n.d.). Why Are so Many Domestic Workers in debt? [online] enrichhk.org. Available at: https://enrichhk.org/why-are-so-many-domestic-workers- debt#:~:text=According%20to%20our%20research%2C%2083 [Accessed 14 Oct. 2023].

Experian Asia Pacific and Enrich HK (2019). The Value of Care. [online] enrichhk.org. Available at: https://enrichhk.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Final_The-Value-of- Care_Full-Report.pdf [Accessed 13 Oct. 2023].

Immigration Department (2023). Statistics on the Number of Foreign Domestic Helpers in Hong Kong. [online] Available at: https://data.gov.hk/en-data/dataset/hk-immd-set4-statistics-fdh [Accessed 21 Oct. 2023].

Ladegaard, H.J. (2013b). Demonising the cultural Other: Legitimising dehumanisation of foreign domestic helpers in the Hong Kong press. Discourse, Context & Media, 2(3), pp.131–140. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2013.06.002.

Lai, M. (2010). Dancing to different tunes: Performance and activism among migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong. Women’s Studies International Forum, 33(5), pp.501–511. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2010.07.003.

Tong, Y. and Jiang, N. (2020). Much Ado About Nothing? Do Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong Benefit From Capital Accumulation? American Behavioral Scientist, 64(6), p.000276422091023. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764220910236.

Yeung, N.C.Y., Kan, K.K.Y., Wong, A.L.Y. and Lau, J.T.F. (2020). Self-stigma, resilience, perceived quality of social relationships, and psychological distress among Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong: A mediation model. Stigma and Health. doi:https://doi.org/10.1037/sah0000246.

Zhou, H., Dai, H. and Jung, N. (2019). Empowering migrant domestic helpers through financial education. International Journal of Social Welfare, 29(2). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12385.

Tags Labour Exploitation, Migration, SD4116, Social Inclusion

Building Sustainable, Inclusive and Just Cities (Hons module)

The Colombo-Venezuelan border: a magnet for the social exclusion of younger generations in the San Antonio Community

Post author By whc8
Post date Monday 29 December 2025
No Comments on The Colombo-Venezuelan border: a magnet for the social exclusion of younger generations in the San Antonio Community

Introduction to Venezuela’s background: Independence from The Spanish Crown and its geopolitical history

Venezuela, located in the north of South America, was once a land conquered by The Spaniards. The country fought for its independence from The Spanish Crown between 1813-1823, and it was not until 9 October 1823 that Venezuela was liberated by Simon Bolivar from the ultimate Spanish royalist forces (Britannica, n.d.). During the independence war period, an alliance named “La Gran Colombia” (The Great Colombia) was created in 1819, constituted by Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama; these “revolutionary forces” were led by Simon Bolivar (Britannica, 2023) and served as a powerful united nation. However, Venezuela was driven by military rivalry and regional conflicts to exit La Gran Colombia, which led to the creation of a new national constitution that granted Venezuela its desire to become a sovereign nation in 1830 (see Britannica, 2023). Ever since, Venezuela has experienced a number of transitions, ranging from autocratic regimes to its most democratic era in the 1960s and 70s, and most recently to Chavismo and Madurismo. The latter regimes have unfortunately led to a failed socio-economic state that is driving mass migrations out of Venezuela due to a degradation in the health care sector, hyperinflation, food scarcity, lack of a proper education, shortages of labor opportunities and increased crime. (See appendix 1 – Venezuela’s inflation trend).

This community briefing report closely looks at San Antonio del Tachira, positioned on the west of Venezuela and adjacent to the North Santander region of Colombia. This location of interest is the Colombo-Venezuelan border; one of the key border crossing points through which a significant proportion of migration has taken place. (See appendix 2 – Geographical location of San Antonio). San Antonio city, Venezuela, and the Colombian border city of Cucuta are interconnected by the Simon Bolivar International Bridge, which is a crucial crossing point between the two nations. San Antonio is therefore an essential gateway for Venezuelans who want to emigrate to Colombia and further afield as they can do so by foot. I used to live in the Tachira State (city of San Cristobal), so I have been a witness of the border dynamics that go on in this area because I have crossed this border by foot several times. Hence, this report is written by an insider who can address the social exclusion struggles and challenges faced by young people in the San Antonio community.

Migration dynamics (50 years ago to the present day)

Venezuela was, and remains, a resources-rich (oil, minerals) country. It was once sustained by a stable economy and filled with opportunities that enabled economic and personal growth. It also ranked as one of the richest developing nations in the world, so Venezuela had a net in-flow of migration. Therefore, citizens rarely left their country as there was no perceived need to look for a better quality of life elsewhere. However, the levels of economic poverty had been high for a long time before the mass exodus begun. For this reason, the root exclusion cause arises from the large population of Venezuelans who lived in poverty and were promised more access to resources as of 1998, which is when President Chavez was elected (Reid, 2023). In an attempt to ease the exclusion of the poor by reforming the economy to mitigate poverty, the actions taken by the communist-totalitarian regime of Venezuela have over the long term only caused more resentment within these communities towards the wealthier part of the population and increased the inequality gap in the whole country. Consequently, corruption, lack of governance, the destruction of the economic apparatus and rising exclusion of the poor led Venezuela to become a failed state. The Colombo-Venezuelan border closure in 2015 (The Guardian, 2015) marked the beginning of the migratory phenomenon, and it aggravated the exclusion problem on the border. The San Antonio del Tachira community has thus suffered the consequences of corruption and extra-legal border crossing that is enforced by paramilitary groups, drug trafficking, human contraband, and child prostitution (see Mantilla, 2019).

The community challenge

The challenge explored lies in the hotspot of San Antonio del Tachira-North Santander region, where a significant number of migrants have decided to stay put and are over stressing the social services and labor markets leading to increased crime, contraband, prostitution, and bribery. That being the case, this community briefing aims to address the exclusion caused by the ongoing situation of mass migration that has been unleashed on the border between Venezuela and Colombia in the last 10 years but that had already been happening for 20 years. The report outlines the various problems the socially excluded community of Venezuelan citizens who live in the city of San Antonio del Tachira (Venezuela) face. Community members cross over to Cucuta daily to look for schooling, employment, food, and healthcare. Furthermore, the report focuses on the effects that migration has had on younger generations as they are vulnerable groups of people who are constantly exposed to crime and corruption, thus facing lack of opportunity for personal growth. Finally, it shall propose some recommendations for the community to undertake which are founded by the purpose of reducing the exclusion caused by inaction from the Venezuelan regime.

Emergence of migration and Social Exclusion in San Antonio

In the last 20 years, the socio-economic hit that Venezuela took has resulted in key community role players, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and many other professionals, fleeing the country. This outflow of migration has been greatly detrimental to the country because as of now “Venezuela continues to face one of the largest external displacement crises, with over 7.7 million Venezuelans now residing abroad” (Reid, 2023). Moreover, Pelacani & Moreno (2023, p.499), portray the exodus as “the biggest movement of immigrants at a regional and even the second biggest movement, worldwide”; second to Syria, this constitutes one of the largest, and possibly the least reported mass migrations of all times. For instance, Latin America alone hosts “the vast majority of Venezuelans, with Colombia accounting for some 1.3 million, followed by Peru, with 768,000, Chile 288,000, Ecuador 263,000, Brazil 168,000, and Argentina 130,000” (UNHCR, 2019). This outflow has exacerbated social exclusion of young people as, on the one hand, many teachers have given up their teaching careers in schools and universities, thereby creating a ruptured education system. On the other hand, the ability of those living in poverty to access healthcare has reduced as social services collapsed. In addition, with rapidly rising migration rates and the high exodus of people crossing the Colombo-Venezuelan border in desperation, the city of San Antonio became seriously destabilised due to the radical closing of the border that brought about recurring illegal crossings through “clandestine paths” referred to as trochas (Mantilla, 2019). Some of these crossings are found under and around the Simon Bolivar International Bridge, thus they facilitate the operations of “extra-legal groups such as Colombian guerrillas, former paramilitaries, and Venezuelan gangs like La Linea to further engage in human smuggling” (Mantilla, 2019). Trochas allow criminal groups to manage and control these paths by giving them a higher authority over both Venezuela’s and Colombia’s state army.

Well known paramilitary groups that are found on the Tachira-North Santander region border are the “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC), which are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the “Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional” (ELN) being the Army of National Liberation (see Insight Crime Report, 2022). These can be understood as Extra-legal Governance Organisations (EGOs) because they promote political corruption and enforce crimes against human rights (Fazekas et al., 2021). It is then relevant to reference these organisations because the border has effectively been under their direct management. These EGOs abet illegal migration into and out of Colombia and Venezuela at the expense of money and goods payments from the people in San Antonio and Cucuta (bribery), and the recruitment of young people to partake in paramilitary networks. For instance, an official local council member of the Tachira State said that paramilitary groups’ strategy on the border was to begin with “recruiting youths aged 15 to 20 years old” to train “them like the famous colectivos. These groups are now the guerrillas’ first line of action” (Insight Crime Report, 2022) – colectivos are carefully and strategically trained groups of civilians that commit crime on behalf of the Venezuelan government. This shows that younger generations are a clear and easy target, which puts them at high risk of being recruited by paramilitary groups as these organisations pray on their state of need and vulnerability. Moreover, the burdens on the people of San Antonio are often reinforced by the psychological impact that is caused on the communities living in very close proximity to the border. This is supported by the claim of another local political leader which stated that “living in the border is not easy. It means sleeping with one eye open, being aware that from one moment to the next you could fall victim to a bullet or a shootout that has nothing to do with you” (Insight Crime Report, 2022).

As a result of illegal border crossing and the lack of legitimate governance and migratory controls, “pendular migrants” (citizens who cross the border on a daily basis and perhaps stay on the other side of the border on a temporary basis), in particular younger generations, may be even more vulnerable to violence, increased exposure to diseases, forced prostitution and mental health trauma (R4V, 2022, cited in Correa-Salazar et al., 2023, p.177). This is because the enforcement of movement policies has been restricted by the closure of the border, which consequently has undermined the protection of migrants as human rights continue to be violated. Therefore, the humanitarian crisis observed in Venezuela is compounded by the power that paramilitary groups have over border control, and both indeed “create physical, social, economic, and policy risk environments for already vulnerable migrants” (R4V, 2022, cited in Correa-Salazar et al., 2023, p.177) as well as for the young people of San Antonio. The research conducted by Correa-Salazar et al (2023, p.183) reports that a teenage girl who participated in their work communicated that she was “forced to engage in transactional sex with older men” to help her family economically. This has led such “sex dynamics and trafficking” to become normalised in neighbouring communities, such as in Cucuta city, where a large proportion of pendular migrants tend to settle.

Cucuta is just across the border and other Colombian cities are relatively close to Venezuela, so mass uncontrolled migration flow has created a risk environment in Colombia that is gradually “reinforced by economic hardship, poverty, gender roles, and lack of legal migration status” (Correa-Salazar et al., 2023, p.186). La Parada in Cucuta, which is the name of the area on the Colombian side of the border, “is considered by law enforcement a crime-ridden slum” (Mantilla, 2019). This is because of the border dynamics that have been previously mentioned, therefore many people who cross over to Colombia tend to remain in this area which attracts criminals from both countries. And with crime rates potentially intensified by the exodus, Venezuelans who reside, work, or study in Colombia have been deeply stigmatised, hence the Venezuelan community struggles with xenophobia in its neighbouring country. This also affects people from San Antonio as they cross the border on a daily basis. However, Colombia has put a lot of effort into promoting measures that enhance inclusion and aid the settling of Venezuelans. For instance, some policies have been amended to facilitate employability in Colombia; since 2021, expired Venezuelan passports for almost a lapse of 10 years were widely accepted (Pelacani & Moreno, 2023) thus reducing paperwork hassle. In Cucuta, a community-led “soup kitchen” was established on the border, led by a church and its volunteers with the support of United Nations bodies, to provide Venezuelans who cross the border with hot food (Mantilla, 2019). Lastly, Venezuelans were granted relatively easy access to health care, such as COVID-19 vaccinations during the pandemic, as people could cross the border to get vaccinated on the other side – A few of my own family members had the opportunity to get vaccinated in Cucuta.

Proposed recommendations for the community

The following measures are proposed to reduce the social exclusion of Venezuelans from San Antonio caused by inaction from the Venezuelan regime and shall suggest how to maximise the social inclusion of Venezuelans, particularly pendular migrants, in the host Colombian country.

What can the Local Council and community of Cucuta do? (Colombia)

Due to the huge effect that hyperinflation and food scarcity has had in Venezuelans’ nutrition, Cucuta should continue to enforce initiatives like the soup kitchen and thus encourage more of its community members to volunteer in helping out migrants from Venezuela who cross the border looking to alleviate hunger. Most importantly, the community of Cucuta should ensure that non-governmental organisations like the Red Cross and United Nations are also supporting these initiatives by potentially making these organisations sponsors of their good cause. On the other hand, the Local Council of Cucuta and associated mayors should monitor their policies that cover migration in order to: provide straightforward homologation of studies in the area and facilitate the access of Venezuela’s young people to education and Colombia’s labor market. Moreover, the community should work together to improve the inclusion of migrants by reducing xenophobic behaviours against Venezuelans and speaking up for those being harassed.

Suggestions for promoting social inclusion in San Antonio (Venezuela)

Many of the Venezuelans who live in San Antonio may be ignorant of their citizen rights. They unconsciously accept the oppression from the Venezuelan regime and give up on the pursual of human rights, thus slowly becoming impotent towards the multiple situations presented in front of them and the associated consequences. However, in most cases there is no other option than to follow the government’s radical policies. I would like to propose that the Local Council of the State of Tachira must focus on ensuring that people who live on the border in San Antonio are given a voice, perhaps through town halls led by council leaders of the state, and so are carefully considered when making decisions that concern border closures. Even though this can be quite challenging since the whole country is governed by corrupt and communist-totalitarian rulers, I truly believe that a community can come together to form a strong alliance, similar to what La Gran Colombia once was but at a level of the Colombo-Venezuelan border, through the establishment of an action programme that integrates both sides of the border. This can indeed empower citizens of San Antonio and allow them to find the confidence that is necessary to speak up and make sure that their voices are heard. In addition, community members should pressure the state council to pursue more help from powerful and accountable non-governmental organisations, like the United Nations, to bring humanitarian aid points into Venezuela, and most importantly into San Antonio. As Correa-Salazar et al (2023, p.186) argue, “organizations acting in the community level through outreach, community engagement, peer leaderships, and social institutions like churches or community dining places (where migrants are provided meals)” are key role players in reducing, or even deterring, attempts of physical violence and extortion in San Antonio.

Increased awareness towards well-off Venezuelans around San Antonio should be promoted through accurate social media channels and unbiased news channels. This is to make them more aware of the excluded community on the border and thus create incentives to help other people in the area. This could involve opening local businesses like canteens that provide food services for people in need, or bringing meals that are easily prepared to nurseries or schools. Additionally, since food scarcity in Venezuela has brought about drastic changes in peoples’ diets, Venezuelan farm owners can use agricultural practices and knowledge to harvest crops that have been in high demand across the whole country, in order to improve food availability and provide those people who cannot afford expensive foods with vegetables, fruits and sources of protein. This would add to community empowerment by reducing citizens’ reliance on conventional supermarket stock availability. (See appendix 3 – Food consumption changes in Venezuela).

In recent years, job opportunities that do not require people to have a degree in higher education have become increasingly available. I consider people in San Antonio to be more than capable of finding opportunities to work and earning some money in different ways. For example: art crafts, such as making jewellery, baking, cooking, or event planning workshops possibly directed by members from around San Antonio. This incentive can provide work experience that will allow young people, as well as older generations, to establish at least a minimum income. Earning money in this way may not be enough to make a living but at least it grants community members the right to work and to personal development.

Ultimately, the community as a whole should ensure that young people are protected from crime exposure. I suggest that a potential action for the community of San Antonio can be to seek for nano finance plans as these provide money borrowing to individuals, either small or large money sums, for investing in social enterprises in the city and for personal use (Bills, 2018). Through this version of microfinance, “more possibilities for reaching the underserved” are available and, considering that nano finance offers service plans that are easily modified, the technology used for these services sets up a “new communication channel that drives long-term adoption” (Bills, 2018). This can not only promote poverty eradication, but also may encourage and incentivise young people to look for courses in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) or even empower older generations to establish counselling programs (see UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Survey, 2013) to help younger generations find education opportunities, such as apprenticeship programs that teach courses from how to harvest different crops (agriculture) to perhaps management accounting (budgeting). This could mean that young people are more likely to stay away from being recruited to work in paramilitary groups. Community-led support groups could be promoted to also help and mentor teenagers who have been victims of physical violence and who now struggle with trauma.

Conclusion

The wide variety of challenges faced by the community of San Antonio, particularly the younger generations, not only at a local level but also on the other side of the border, clearly show how social exclusion is a result of collateral damage caused by the lack of action from the highly autocratic and corrupt Venezuelan regime. Social exclusion has become a serious problem in the San Antonio del Tachira-North Santander region because of the alarming and devastating number of Venezuelans crossing the Colombo-Venezuelan border, which consequently brought distress and chaos in San Antonio. Young people and their families cross the border not just for the purpose of migrating but also to be able to find food, medicine, and access to healthcare services. Sadly, these are basic needs that are nowadays difficult to access in Venezuela. The exodus of professionals (doctors, nurses) and education advocators meant that access to social and educational services became almost impossible to obtain as hospitals and schools have entered a state of near collapse. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the biggest impact of all, in my opinion, has been the emergence of a degraded education system that little by little continues to deteriorate even further. I left the country when pupils and university students were only beginning to notice the consequences of the failed education system, and now I can see the aftermath reflected upon my own childhood friends who went to school with me back in Venezuela.

On a positive note, the government of Colombia has indeed been an important partner in providing Venezuelan migrants with humanitarian aid – the support that San Antonio citizens were desperately looking for. It could therefore be argued that, until today, the strong ties created by La Gran Colombia between its country members have remained somehow hidden but favourable to Venezuela, as demonstrated by how neighbouring countries have responded to the exodus, in particular Colombia. I believe that if the community of San Antonio is to thrive and get back up on its feet, they should fight to prevent the control of the communist machine. (See appendix 4 – Picture taken by my dad in Venezuela).

Reference list

Britannica (n.d.) The independence movement [online]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Venezuela/The-independence-movement (Accessed 20 October 2023).

Britannica (2023) Gran Colombia [online]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Gran-Colombia (Accessed 20 October 2023).

BBC News (2019) ‘Venezuela: All you need to know about the crisis in nine charts’, BBC News, 4 February [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-46999668 (Accessed 22 October 2023).

Bills, R. (2018) World Economic Forum [online]. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/move-over-microfinance-here-s-why-the-future-of-development-is-in-nanofinance/ (Accessed 25 October 2023).

Correa-Salazar, C., Page, K., Martinez-Donate, A. (2023) ‘The Migration Risk Environment: Challenges to Human Security for Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Women and Girls Pre- and Post-Migration to Colombia’, Journal on Migration and Human Security, vol.11, no.2, pp. 175-193 [online]. Available at: https://www-scopus-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85165435858&origin=resultslist&sort=plf-f&src=s&sid=502d2effc8c893b2f8ddff6454e8ef25&sot=b&sdt=b (Accessed 11 October 2023).

Fazekas, M., Sberna, S., Vannucci, A. (2021) ‘The extra-legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement’, Governance, vol.35, no.4, pp.1139-1161 [online]. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gove.12648 (Accessed 11 October 2023).

Insight Crime Report (2022) The Colombo-Venezuelan Guerrillas: How Colombia’s War Migrated to Venezuela [online]. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/The-Colombo-Venezuelan-Guerrillas-How-Colombias-War-Migrated-to-Venezuela-InSight-Crime-Oct-2022.pdf (Accessed 4 October 2023).

Mantilla, J. (2019) Law Faculty Website [online]. Available at: https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/12/border-control (Accessed 4 October 2023).

Pelacani, G., Moreno, C. (2023) ‘The Response of the Colombian State to Venezuelan Migration: Migratory Regularization to the Detriment of Asylum’, Derecho PUCP, vol.90, pp. 497-522 [online]. Available at: https://www-scopus-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85167460267&origin=resultslist&sort=plf-f&src=s&sid=502d2effc8c893b2f8ddff6454e8ef25&sot=b&sdt=b&s=TITLE-ABS-KEY%28venezuela+migration%29&sl=41&sessionSearchId=502d2effc8c893b2f8ddff6454e8ef25 (Accessed 11 October 2023).

Reid, K. (2023) World Vision [online]. Available at: https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/venezuela-crisis-facts (Accessed 23 October 2023).

The Economist (2009) ‘Politics versus trade’, The Economist, 10 September [online]. Available at: https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2009/09/10/politics-versus-trade (Accessed 22 October 2023).

The Guardian (2015) ‘Venezuela closes key crossing with Colombia after three soldiers shot’, The Guardian, 20 August [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/venezuela-maduro-colombia-border (Accessed 21 October 2023).

UNHCR (2019) UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/news-releases/refugees-and-migrants-venezuela-top-4-million-unhcr-and-iom (Accessed 4 October 2023).

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013) Online survey on promoting empowerment of people in achieving poverty eradication, social integration and decent work for all [online], New York, UN. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3868800?ln=es (Accessed 25 October 2023).

Appendix

Appendix 1. From Bloomberg (n.d.) cited in BBC news (2019)

Appendix 2. From The Economist (2009)

Appendix 3. From Bengoa-Enconvi (2017) cited in BBC news (2019)

Appendix 4. “For the machine to work, your ignorance is needed” Taken by Briceno-Sanchez, 2023

Tags Migration, Political Instability, Population Loss, SD4116, Social Inclusion

Building Sustainable, Inclusive and Just Cities (Hons module)

The Challenge of Housing Toronto’s Largest Immigrant Groups during the City’s Housing Crisis

Post author By whc8
Post date Thursday 13 November 2025
No Comments on The Challenge of Housing Toronto’s Largest Immigrant Groups during the City’s Housing Crisis

Background

Toronto’s housing crisis is caused by a lack of supply, increased demand, and skyrocketing costs. This lack of housing in Toronto has a particular impact on immigrants as 31.4% of immigrants in the last federal census were considered low-income, compared with 12.5% of domestic Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2016). Since 2016 the federal government has rapidly increased immigration numbers, targeting accepting 500,000 annually by 2025 (The Canadian Press, 2022). If historical data is to be followed approximately 36% of these immigrants will settle in Toronto, leading to a sizable increase in the city’s demand for housing (Walks, 2020). Therefore, finding safe, affordable housing for these immigrants is crucial. These immigrants come primarily from three countries, India, China, and the Philippines who make up 25% of all settled immigrants in Toronto and 40% of recent immigrants (City of Toronto, 2019). This report is written to you, members of the Chinese, Filipino and Indian communities across Toronto, regarding how you can provide community-based support to new Chinese, Filipino and Indian immigrants. This report will demonstrate the importance of community-led approaches but first it will explore why I feel qualified to speak on this issue and define these communities in Toronto, second, it will investigate the current challenges posed by Toronto’s housing market and third, highlight community-led solutions that can be implemented to make housing accessible to all new immigrants in Toronto.

I am a Toronto-born resident who has lived in Toronto’s “Greektown” for almost all my life. I have engaged with immigrant communities, including first, second and third generation Canadians from various ethnicities in Toronto on a day-today basis, academically, and professionally. In recent years I have become increasingly aware of the pressing nature of Toronto’s housing crisis on new immigrants who make up a vital component of Toronto. While I am not a member of the Chinese, Indian or Filipino communities I feel qualified to suggest community-led housing solutions for new immigrants to these communities as I possess an extensive academic and experiential knowledge of Toronto’s immigrant communities and their importance to the city. Additionally, I have an excellent understanding of the advantages and challenges of implementing sustainable solutions that I have acquired over four years of university study in Sustainable Development.

Toronto’s Indian, Filipino and Chinese Communities

New immigrants from these countries continue to face challenges in finding housing across Toronto. New immigrants, particularly those in the low-income category will inevitably want to live near financial and cultural centres as they look to integrate into familiar communities in search of work. This is something Indian, Chinese, and Filipino immigrants have historically done with the establishment of various ethnicity-based neighbourhoods across Toronto.

Toronto’s Chinese community is large and Chinese people have immigrated to Toronto since the early 20^th century and established businesses and communities with two downtown hubs, named East and West Chinatown (Flack, 2023). Recently, Chinese immigrants have spread out across Toronto increasing pockets of Chinese culture, with a basis of Chinese cultural influence downtown. Indian immigration to Toronto is increasingly influential as between 2013 and 2023 Indian immigration to Canada tripled from approximately 32,000 to 118,000 people annually, many of whom will aim to settle in Indian communities across Toronto and will face housing challenges (Anderson, 2023). Toronto’s Indian population is spread out across the city, however, there is a community hub for Indian culture and businesses called “Little India”, (Destination Toronto, 2023). Filipino immigration to Toronto also has a long history, with the first major increase in immigrants coming to Toronto in the 1960s (Heritage Toronto, 2020). There is also a history of community support within the Filipino community as the Silayan Community Centre has helped build housing for low-income Filipino immigrants (Heritage Toronto, 2020). There is also a Filipino cultural hub called “Little Manila” where there are several Filipino shops and cultural events (Mok, 2020). The importance of the “Chinatowns”, “Little India” and “Little Manila” is that they are regions where new immigrants can find jobs without limitations of language and cultural differences and highlight the continued and integral presence of the Indian, Chinese, and Filipino communities across Toronto.

The Challenge: Accommodating New Immigrants in an Unsustainable Housing Market

Toronto’s current housing crisis is impacted by two main issues: lack of supply and unaffordability. Some argue these issues are driven by Canada’s push to increase immigration and how approximately 36% of immigrants choose to settle in Toronto (King’s Printer of Ontario, 2023). However, others attribute the crisis to a lack of skilled workers and a low supply of raw materials, part of which could be addressed by immigration (Robitaille, 2023). This report, however, will highlight how the basis of Toronto’s housing crisis is the flawed approach of the provincial and municipal governments.

The government-based approach has focused on the construction of condominiums across Toronto to help increase supply. However, this approach has not considered the unavailability of many of these condominiums to low-income immigrants. Between 2000 and 2020 very little purpose-built rental housing was constructed across Toronto meaning private houses and condominiums took up most of the stock (Hawes and Grisdale, 2020). These private companies benefit by marketing their condominiums towards high income, luxury renters which has resulted in fewer low-income housing options. This has resulted in Toronto’s housing bubble being supported by large corporate and individual desires for wealth causing high property values (Bunce and Livingstone, 2020). What highlights the influence of this lack of supply best is that in the summer of 2023 hundreds of newcomers to Toronto were housed by the government and Non-Governmental Organisations in churches and hotels rather than being able to find rentable housing (Jackson and Rocca, 2023).

Additionally, Toronto’s housing market is generally unaffordable. In 2019 UBS stated that Toronto’s housing market was the second most overvalued in the world (Walks, 2020). This unaffordability is a direct result of the financialization of downtown Toronto. Financialization is essentially a process by which financial markets, their institutions and their actors gain increasing influence (Swayer, 2014). Walks (2020) argues this has led to more gentrification downtown and caused immigrants to move to suburbs away from cultural and financial hubs. Additionally, the government has catered its housing policy towards these private interests inevitably increasing the markets unaffordability (Bunce and Livingstone, 2020). However, this is more impactful on immigrant communities as they are represented disproportionately in Canada’s low-income category.

Another major challenge in supporting new immigrants in Toronto is shifting the perspective they are negatively impacting the housing market. 15% of Canadians believe that immigration is increasing housing costs and making housing unaffordable for Canadians (Zeidler, 2023). Additionally, experts say that there is a continued anti-immigrant and refugee sentiment with 57% of Canadians saying Canada should not accept any more refugees (Johnston, 2019). Whilst, refugees are different to immigrants, low-income immigrants require many of the same services, therefore it is safe to assume those opposing accepting refugees would also oppose supporting low-income immigrants. Thus, being seen as the issue could reduce support for immigrants. The number of immigrants should not be perceived as the challenge, rather the challenge should be understood as how to house them as they are crucial to supporting the aging Canadian population as demonstrated by how Canada’s population increased by 1 million people in 2022, with almost 100% of this being driven by immigration (Shakil, 2023). This emphasizes the importance of housing immigrants in Toronto which is only further highlighted by how by 2032 almost 100% of Canada’s population growth will come from immigration (Zeidler, 2023).

Therefore, to maintain the flow of immigration from China, India and the Philippines into Toronto and to ensure these immigrants have housing three main issues need to be addressed, immigration needs to be understood as a benefit rather than a disadvantage, housing needs to be understood not as a commodity but rather as a necessity, and a new community-led approach needs to be implemented as the governmental approach does not effectively address the concerns of all immigrants.

The Solutions: Making Housing in Toronto Accessible to all Immigrants

Experts argue not addressing the influence of Toronto’s housing crisis on new immigrants, including those from China, Philippines and India could result in a loss of talent, diversity, and a slower-growing economy (Jackson and Rocca, 2023). As the governments’ approach is ineffective, community-based solutions are the best way of addressing this urban challenge. This section will first explore the flaws of the municipal and provincial governments suggested solutions. It will then explore how your communities can support the many thousands of new immigrants looking for housing in your communities, at the individual level through refocusing your mindset regarding housing and being aware of the benefits of immigration and at the community level through the establishment of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and immigrant organizations.

The Proposed Government Solution

The current approach of the municipal and provincial governments to addressing Toronto’s housing crisis is flawed. Toronto’s government has promised to construct 285,000 homes by 2031 (Balintec, 2023). The provincial government has promised to build 1.5 million homes by then, with many of those homes being built in Toronto (Jackson and Rocca, 2023). While there is no doubt the construction of additional homes is beneficial, simply building the homes lacks focus, and could have disproportionate effects on immigrant communities, like the effects the unfocused American housing plan has had on Hispanic immigrants. Across the United States 2^nd and 3^rd generation Hispanic immigrants do not access housing resources at a rate proportional to their poverty levels and face significant challenges accessing affordable housing (Aiken and Reina, 2021). Additionally, the governments’ approach is a continuation of the current understanding of housing as a commodity which has led to gentrification and the conversion of low-cost housing. Should this continue in Toronto we could see something like 1980’s Los Angeles, where the government focused on the financialization and commodification of housing, resulting in increased homelessness amongst immigrants and a housing crisis caused by the governments approach (Nielsen, 1989). Therefore, the focus must be on community-based solutions. Additionally, another reason you as a community are in an excellent position to help is that you have experience immigrating to Toronto and likely have a large base to draw potential financial support from as statistically speaking 1^st generation immigrants across Canada underperform financially relative to 2^nd and 3^rd generation immigrants, with 2^nd generation immigrants’ average earnings jumping 47% from those of their parents (Singer, 2018).

Refocusing your Mindset

Altering your mindset to fully support immigration and refocusing your conceptual understanding of housing is the first step to a community-based solution to ensuring housing is available to all new immigrants. Firstly, to ensure you and your communities remain supportive of continued immigration understanding the vital economic influence of immigrants on the Torontonian and Canadian economies is crucial. Economists agree the Canadian economy would not be able to sustain growth without an influx of immigrants (Zeidler, 2023). Additionally, they argue immigration increases wealth distribution across the country or city they choose to reside in and increases economic efficiency (Powell, 2018). Therefore, new immigrants will help drive the Canadian and Torontonian economies and can fill positions of need in terms of employment in your communities.

To provide housing support effectively, refocusing your conceptual understanding of housing is required. Toronto-based perspectives on housing are driven by private market providers where understanding at both government and community levels is that housing is a commodity not a right. (Lima, 2021). Understanding housing as a right is challenging as it opposes Toronto’s general economic approach. However, it can be done on the individual level through supporting non-profits who build and manage low-income units (Bates, 2022). Perhaps more influentially refocusing your perspective to community rather than financial needs will be far easier through the establishment and your potential participation in CDCs and immigrant organisations.

CDCs and community level support

Since the 1960s, CDCs have operated in depressed urban and rural communities and are defined by Grogan (1996) as a citizen-led group that aims to revitalize a particular neighbourhood or town and engage residents in taking direct responsibility for a communities’ future. They have had some historical success across the United States and between 1988 and 1994 constructed 410,000 houses in response to failing government approaches to low-income housing crises (Grogan, 1996). I believe establishing new CDCs could be effective in Toronto as it would allow for the easy integration of new immigrants from India, China, and the Philippines into your communities as they could access services in their native language and affordable housing provided to them via CDCs.

An excellent example of the benefits of CDCs comes from the Unity Council based around Fruitvale Station in Oakland California. This region is home to a high percentage of immigrants and the council provides extensive social services and has attempted to address threats of increased property values through creating a land bank to prevent local businesses and residents from being displaced (Kirkpatrick, 2007). Furthermore, they have also capped property taxes for long term residents and have gained federal and state funding to assess community concerns (Kirkpatrick, 2007). Thus, the CDC benefits local residents but also ensures affordable housing is continuing to be constructed in the neighbourhood despite increasing property values. Additionally, the board of the Unity Council includes residents, property developers and two impartial parties, allowing for developments within the community to be beneficial to both the community and property developers (Kirkpatrick, 2007).

This could easily be implemented across Filipino, Chinese, and Indian communities in Toronto. Different CDCs could be based in neighbourhoods where many of your communities’ businesses and residents live. One of the biggest advantages of using CDCs is they combine public and private capital and that once they are seen as legitimate methods of acquiring housing more people use them increasing their influence and financial viability. Additionally, CDCs have a non-commodity-based goal of providing housing and services to residents, which can help shift the understanding of housing as a commodity (Grogan, 1996). Importantly, CDCs benefit both long-term and new residents as they can cap local property costs. Moreover, both the municipal and federal governments are pursuing various avenues to addressing the housing crisis and if a CDC in any of your communities gained significant traction, it is safe to assume that either or both the municipal and provincial governments would likely be able to provide financial support. Establishing a CDC offers an increase in jobs and positions of power to members of your communities and would be able to offer employment programs for new immigrants who would then be able to assist with finding housing for future immigrants. One major flaw to this approach in Toronto is that it assumes everyone from a community lives in the same neighbourhood. This evidently is not the case, however, the establishment of various CDCs in Indian, Filipino and Chinese communities across the city could be beneficial and reduce the impact of this. Grogan (1996) points out an additional limitation in that public policy is not designed thinking of the influence of potential policies on fragile CDCs. However, in Toronto’s immigrant communities I believe CDCs could bring people together across neighbourhoods and obtain financial support from a larger base of 2^nd and 3^rd generation immigrants across the city to help reduce the market-based influence that currently exists. Therefore, while there are certainly flaws in the CDC approach the benefits outweigh them and when combined with immigrant organisations as discussed below, they have the potential to be influential in addressing Toronto’s housing crisis.

Immigrant Organisations

An immigrant organisation is an organisation formed by individuals who are members of a particular national/ethnic group that focuses on providing social services to primarily the same ethnic group (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). They are different from other social service providers as they explicitly incorporate cultural components and a consciousness of ethnic and national origins (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). According to Cordero-Guzmán (2005) they are typically formed in large, growing immigrant groups and function by receiving government grants, contracts, and philanthropic donations. There are various advantages to immigrant organizations. Firstly, they ensure specific cultures are preserved and new immigrants are supported through various social services that are available in a cultural setting they are accustomed to. Secondly, unlike CDCs, immigrant organisations are not tied to one neighbourhood, rather they can move with the market and alter their contributions to different areas based on need. Thirdly, they have a wide range of potential supporters as through donations from corporations, foundations, and individuals these immigrant organisations can help provide low-cost housing solutions, construct purpose-built housing across Toronto for members of their communities and expand connections between immigrants across the city. There are however some disadvantages to the immigrant organisation approach. For example, like CDCs the housing market is not designed for the benefit of immigrant organisations, it is constructed with private corporations in mind. Additionally, there is no distinct focus of most of these organisations beyond supporting a specific ethnic group, they are not housing-focused and thus, the funds acquired by an organisation could be directed towards non-housing related issues. One last major advantage of immigrant organisations is the support that it can direct towards smaller direct-action movements. For example, in your communities an immigrant organisation could support direct action movements looking to drive support for purpose-built housing in your communities. This does not necessarily need to be achieved via protest it can be achieved by immigrant organisations commissioning research into the impact of a private-market focused housing on their communities and presenting facts and figures to the media or the public that can help increase the social legitimacy of this distinct issue (Lima, 2021). Establishing more focused immigration organisations in Toronto would therefore be extremely beneficial as they could provide distinct support towards affordable housing initiatives.

What would be the most influential solution to providing new immigrants to Toronto with accessible housing would be a combination of a refocused community-based mindset, CDCs, and immigrant organisations. The flaws of each solution would be partly mitigated by the strengths of the others. Investing in and establishing housing-focused immigrant organisations is crucial, as these have the potential to span across Toronto. These organisations could direct their financial resources towards CDCs with a focus on addressing the individual housing needs of specific communities. This solution would be driven by members of these communities rather than the private sector, who have developed a mindset of immigration as a vital element of Toronto’s economic success and a de-commodified understanding of housing. This will allow members of your communities to staff these organisations and challenge the financialization and commodification of housing. Take for example Indian immigrants, the Indian community could establish a central immigrant organization that would receive municipal, provincial, and philanthropic funding. The organisation would direct this funding towards various CDCs operating within Indian neighbourhoods who required the funding to ensure affordable housing and social services were available to Indian immigrants. This immigrant organisation and CDCs would be led by boards that included community members who see immigration as beneficial and housing as a right and property developers who would therefore still benefit from the construction of purpose-built housing. What is important in this potential approach is that it is built by you, community members for your communities. Establishing these organisations allows the government to provide discretionary funding to community-led organisations to direct towards specific housing crises on a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis rather than simply constructing more housing in an unfocused manner as the municipal and provincial governments are proposing. Ideally, using this system your communities will be able to sustain an increase in the number of immigrants and develop and maintain new, affordable, purpose-built community housing. Additionally, the success of this solution would be reliant on community members and as CDCs and immigrant organisations were seen as more effective, they could gain more financial support and increased influence on Toronto’s housing market.

Conclusion

Toronto’s housing crisis significantly impacts current and future immigrants because of the unaffordability and lack of availability of suitable housing. This comes as a direct result of the municipal and provincial governments approaches that have focused on the commodification and financialization of housing and put the control of the market in the hands of private interests. To resolve this issue and help settle the 40% of immigrants that come from India, China, and the Philippines, you 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd generation immigrants from these communities could implement various potential solutions including: ensuring you understand immigration to not be the source of the problem, refocusing your perspective from housing as a commodity to a right and establishing CDC’s and housing-focused immigrant organisations across Toronto. While there are advantages and disadvantages to these solutions, and the fact it would be challenging to implement them in the current market, using all three proposed solutions together results in a far stronger collective solution and leads us to remain hopeful that community-based solutions will help ensure thousands of Chinese, Indian and Filipino immigrants can settle sustainably in Toronto every year.

Works Cited

Aiken, C. Reina, V.J. and, Culhane, D.P. (2021) ‘Understanding Low-Income Hispanic Housing Challenges and the Use of Housing and Homelessness Assistance’, Cityscape, 23 (2), pp. 123-158.

Anderson, S. (2023) Indian Immigration to Canada has Tripled since 2013. Available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2023/03/06/indian-immigration-to-canada-has-tripled-since-2013/?sh=2685819a5620 (Accessed: 21 October 2023).

Balintec, V. (2023) Toronto is facing a crushing housing shortage. Here’s how a new city committee plans to tackle it. Available at https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/chow-toronto-housing-committee-1.6934132 (Accessed: 21 October 2023).

Bates, L.K. (2022) ‘Housing for People, Not for Profit: Models of Community-Led Housing’ Planning Theory and Practice, 23 (2), pp. 267-302.

Bunce, S. and Livingstone, W. (2020) ‘Realestate and housing. A Commentary Dynamics of a housing crisis – the politics and planning of housing in London and Toronto’ in Bunce S., Livingstone, N., March, L. Moore, S. and Walks, A. (eds.), Critical Dialogues of Urban Governance, Development and Activism, London: UCL Press, pp. 208-216.

City of Toronto. Health Check T.O. (2019). Population Demographics. Toronto: City of Toronto. Available at https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/99b4-TOHealthCheck_2019Chapter1.pdf (Accessed: 20 October 2023).

Cordero- Guzmán, H.R. (2005) ‘Community Based Organisations and Migration in New York City’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31 (5), pp. 889-909.

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The Canadian Press. (2022) Ottawa Reveals Plan to Welcome 500,000 Immigrants per year by 2025 Available at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-immigration-500000-2025-1.6636661#:~:text=2915-,The%20federal%20government%20is%20planning%20a%20massive%20increase%20in%20the,to%20ensure%20Canada’s%20economic%20prosperity. (Accessed: 20 October 2023).

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Tags Affordable Housing, Migration, Polarisation, SD4116

Blog Featured Latest from the Lab

Vulnerability and Flexible Population Filtering: RUL members Papada and Vradis contribute to new R&L edited volume

Post author By Antonis Vradis
Post date Tuesday 9 August 2022
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Two RUL members, Dr Evie Papada and Dr Antonis Vradis, have contributed a chapter to The Migration Mobile, an edited volume recently published by Rowman and Littlefield. Book info is here, and the chapter’s introduction follows.

In the aftermath of the European ‘crisis’, policies championing the imperative to protect the most vulnerable refugees have turned vulnerability into a defining marker of asylum policy (Smith and Waite 2018). Even more recently, in the midst of the currently ongoing global pandemic, vulnerability has taken centre stage in shaping policy responses; yet this time round, it is vulnerable populations, not individuals, that seem to drive these. In this chapter we first place vulnerability at the centre of the EC’s hotspot approach for managing migration. We do so in order to address the centrality of the concept in affecting the filtering of migrant populations in and beyond the EU’s territorial margins. Here, we look at the EU’s hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey statement2 in concert, as the new architecture of the border regime. Beyond a focus on deterrence and detention as key spatial strategies in the regulation of migrant mobility, we look instead at immigration controls at borders and the ensuing practices of filtering and caring associated with the humanitarian border (Walters 2011). In this first part of the chapter we draw a relationship between EU reliance on asylum as a tool for migration management and the function of categorical vulnerability as a benchmark of international protection. While the designation ‘vulnerable applicant’ was meant to facilitate the allocation of welfare benefits and provide additional safeguards to those undergoing the asylum process, we point to a shift in practice, whereby vulnerability has occupied an increasingly important role in the administrative decision to grant access to the asylum process on the Aegean islands of Lesbos. Then, we demonstrate how vulnerability came to be assessed at the hotspot in Lesvos and became a weapon both in the hands of the authorities but also for asylum applicants.
In the second part of the chapter, we proceed to explore the notion of vulnerability beyond the migrant mobility context, bringing it into the current pandemic conjuncture. Here, we explain how this notion of the vulnerable body has permeated the European body politic and therefore show, retrospectively, how crucial the vulnerability exercise has been for EC policy – not only for the migrant populations originally affected by this, but now virtually for the continent’s entire population.

Tags hotspot, Migration

Projects

Roaming the city of illusions: understanding migrant trajectories through their use of Information and Communication Technologies (Nerina Boursinou)

In 2014/2015, the EU faced one of the most severe border crises in its contemporary history, profoundly reshaping its governance structures and democratic values. Migrants crossing its land and maritime frontiers provoked a number of reactions from its institutions, politicians and citizens. Over the course of the following six years, the EU territory was re/formed through spatial contestations, severe border violence and xenophobic discourses. At the same time, the continent has witnessed unprecedented and decentralised solidarity actions toward these newcomers. In these ways, the continent’s ‘refugee crisis’ involved multiple dynamics between a range of actors and stakeholders, which were not always picked up by mainstream media. Today, a localised and largely invisible humanitarian crisis still unfolds as a result of hostile EU policies aiming to restrict migrant mobility by deploying militarised technology and personnel at its internal and external borders. These developments have created new complexities in the study of migrant mobility, border control, and resistance. Questions are raised around the impact that the EU’s emerging border regime has on migrants’ well-being on an everyday personal, and a more collective level.

In 2017-2018, I conducted original field research in three sites: a refugee camp, an occupied public building and an immigration detention centre in Athens, Greece. I looked at the ways in which (forced) migrants would navigate everyday life, as they were in a long-term mode of waiting to restart their life. I explored the role that smartphones and other Information and Communication Technologies (also known as ICTs) played in their life circumstances at the time.

During my Fellowship I am focused on disseminating the findings of my research to a range of audiences which include academics but also – and perhaps more importantly- the wider societies. Specifically, I am authoring research papers to be published in academic journals and I am also co-organising certain impact and engagement activities. These activities, include the production of a digital magazine (also known as zine) with the active collaboration of migrants, activists and artists where we will be presenting our shared ideas about social inclusion and the daily experiences of living together in the urban fabric. Additionally, I am producing a limited series podcast where I will be discussing with women researchers about their fantastic work but also the lived experience of being a woman early -career in today’s academia.

Tags Athens, Migration

Projects

Decolonising the City (DtC): co-designing a participatory arts-based research toolkit with migrant communities in Athens, Greece (Anna Papoutsi, Penny Travlou and Antonis Vradis)

Decolonising the City (DtC) is a Knowledge Mobilisation Award funded by the Urban Studies Foundation (USF). DtC follows on from our 2019 USF seminar series (Copenhagen, Barcelona, Athens), which brought together academics and practitioners to examine existing migrant welcoming practices and reached two findings. First: academic knowledge needs to be co-produced with the communities it addresses, in ways that are inclusive, relevant and useful to them. Second: this very idea of “urban belonging” is rapidly changing. In this moment of dual transition, migrants settle in European cities (often not their preferred destination) while receiving societies are faced with the legacies of their colonial past.

PROJECT PURPOSE

With these two findings in mind DtC constitutes a series of small-scale field-based interventions aiming to reimagine, together with migrant communities, what “decolonising” urban citizenship means in practice. Our key aim is to generate a participatory arts-based methodological toolkit, co-designed with migrant communities, that will help explore how migrants practice urban citizenship. This KMA grant is focused on migrant communities of African descent in Athens, Greece. We believe this is a vitally important exercise vastly exceeding the city itself, potentially contributing to rapidly growing calls to decolonise the academy, this time from an urban and migrant-focused perspective.

For this short study, we will collaborate with Ubuntu and Anasa: two cultural organisations representing the Afro-Greek communities active in central Athenian neighbourhoods. DtC focuses on Athens for two reasons. First, the city is both at Europe’s periphery and centre: the “birthplace of civilisation” in European imaginaries (Gourgouris 1996; Stenou 2019) is nevertheless at the continent’s edge – geographically, culturally and politically. Athens is therefore both an epicentre of the imagined geography (Said 1979) that gave birth to orientalism, and itself at the receiving end of ensuing colonial and post-colonial transformations. Second, Athens has accommodated thousands of migrants who are unable to move further across the continent, settling in a city itself rattled by more than a decade of consecutive crises (from debt to migrant reception and now Covid-19). In these two ways, Athens exemplifies how colonial imaginaries and legacies intertwine with urban exclusion today.

Figure 1: Map of DtC project neighbourhoods, organisations and key sites in Athens (Google Maps)

RESEARCH DESIGN

Following the theoretical trajectories of the “epistemologies of the South”, introduced by de Sousa Santos (2014), we will develop a methodological toolkit to decolonise urban knowledge. Our methodological toolkit will be constructed via an interdisciplinary, decolonial, intersectional feminist and participatory approach, together with the communities on the ground.

In DtC we will design and test out a participatory arts-based research methodology (PABR, see Nunn 2020) pointing to the contribution and transformative power of creative arts for advocacy and research on citizenship. The growing emphasis on participatory and interdisciplinary arts-based methods is nevertheless largely limited to the Global North. By contrast, DtC adapts this methodological approach to the context of the epistemologies of the South to decolonise academic research with migrants and to provide an inclusive and intersectional research tool for the study of urban citizenship.

The team of researchers includes Anna Papoutsi (Birmingham), Penny Travlou (Edinburgh) and Antonis Vradis (St Andrews).

Tags Athens, decolonise, Migration